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THE MEANING OF BUSH V. GORE: THOUGHTS ON PROFESSOR 
AMAR’S ANALYSIS 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
It is tempting to blame the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Bush v. Gore for the evils the Bush Administration inflicted on the 
nation. If only Al Gore had become president, there would not have 
been the disastrous war in Iraq or the enormous deficit-spending to fund 
it, which has contributed to the worst economic problems since the 
Great Depression. If only Al Gore had become president, the responses 
in the War on Terror would have been more measured and would not 
have included torture and indefinite detentions without due process. If 
only Al Gore had become president, then Justices William Rehnquist 
and Sandra Day O’Connor would have been replaced by individuals far 
more moderate than Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito. 
From the lens of 2009, after eight years of the Bush presidency, the 
consequences of Bush v. Gore are worse than it could have seemed on 
December 12, 2000, when the decision came down.1 Of course, the 
problem with this way of looking at Bush v. Gore is that George W. 
Bush might well have become president even if the U.S. Supreme Court 
never had become involved or had affirmed the Florida Supreme 
Court’s ruling. Counting all of the uncounted votes (what Gore urged) 
might have led to a Bush victory anyway. Also, if the Court stayed out 
of it, the political process ultimately may well have resolved the matter 
in Bush’s favor. 
Professor Akhil Amar’s focus is not on these practical consequences 
of Bush v. Gore, but instead on the judicial opinions. He persuasively 
explains why the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was at least 
reasonable, if not correct, and why the majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court got it wrong. I agree with him. However, I want to focus on the 
larger question: What does Bush v. Gore tell us about judicial review 
and the judicial power? 
For decades, conservatives have attacked what they perceive as 
illegitimate judicial activism. The 2008 Republican platform declares: 
“Judicial activism is a grave threat to the rule of law because 
unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy, ignoring the 
Constitution and its separation of powers, and imposing their personal 
opinions upon the public. This must stop.”2 And conservatives, such as 
Justice Antonin Scalia, purport to pursue a method of analysis having 
no relationship to the views or ideology. 
                                                                                                                     
 * Founding Dean, University of California, Irvine School of Law. Dean and 
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 1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98 (2000). 
 2. 2008 Republican Party Platform, http://www.gop.com/2008 Platform/GovernmentRef 
orm.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009). 
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This picture of judging has great rhetorical force. At his 
confirmation hearings for Chief Justice, John Roberts proclaimed that: 
“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply 
them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure 
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went 
to a ball game to see an umpire.”3 The power of this conservative 
rhetoric also was seen in Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s recent confirmation 
hearings where she repeatedly told the members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that judges must “apply not make the law.”4 
Conservatives thus claim that they have a method of judicial 
decision-making which is neutral and even formalistic, and that liberals 
make it up. This would be a laughable claim, except for its tremendous 
rhetorical power. I have participated in countless debates over 
originalism over the years and inevitably its proponents argue that 
originalists have a theory, while opponents of originalism have none. At 
the very least, conservatives do have slogans—“judges are umpires,” 
“judges should apply not make the law,” “judges should follow the law 
not their personal views”—that have so much rhetorical force that even 
Democratic nominees for the U.S. Supreme Court repeat them. 
It is here that Bush v. Gore and Professor Amar’s critique of it is so 
important: Bush v. Gore is a powerful example of how decision-making 
occurs in constitutional cases. Although unusual in its national 
significance, Bush v. Gore is typical in terms of two crucial points: first, 
Justices have tremendous discretion in deciding constitutional cases; 
and second, how that discretion is exercised is frequently, if not 
inevitably, a product of the Justices’ life experiences and ideology. 
Neither of these propositions should be the least bit controversial, 
except that they are vehemently denied by conservatives, such as the 
Republican Senators who opposed and voted against Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor. Therefore, because it shows that all Justices, liberal or 
conservative, come to results based on their views and ideology, Bush v. 
Gore should be used to forever bury silly adages like “judges are 
umpires who don’t make the rules, but apply them” and “judges should 
apply the law, not make it.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
 4. Peter Baker and Neil A. Lewis, Sotomayor Vows ‘Fidelity to the Law’ as Hearings 
Start, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A1. 
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THE COURT’S DISCRETION IN BUSH V. GORE 
Bush v. Gore is a perfect illustration of the enormous discretion that 
Justices have in constitutional cases. This would seem so obvious as to 
not require elaboration except that it is the crucial flaw in the 
conservative rhetoric about constitutional decision-making: ignorance 
of the inevitably large discretion that exists in constitutional decision-
making. 
Using Bush v. Gore as an example, discretion existed at countless 
levels. Initially, the Court had total discretion as to whether to hear the 
case at all. This came to the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari and that, 
of course, is entirely in the discretion of the Justices; if four Justices 
vote to grant certiorari, the Court hears the case, otherwise it does not. 
The Justices could have simply decided to stay out of the matter entirely 
and let the matter work its way through the Florida courts and the 
political process.  
Once the Court decided to grant certiorari, it then had to decide 
whether to stay the counting of the uncounted ballots. Interestingly, 
Professor Amar does not mention this in his Dunwody Lecture. But I 
believe that this was a crucial moment in the Bush v. Gore litigation. If 
the Court had not granted a stay, all of the uncounted ballots were to 
have been counted by 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 10, the day 
before the oral arguments in Bush v. Gore. Had the counting shown 
Bush ahead, the Gore challenge would have been moot. But had the 
counting shown Gore ahead in Florida, it would have been far more 
difficult for the U.S. Supreme Court to find the recounting 
impermissible.  
As Professor Amar rightly points out, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bush v. Gore premised its decision on Florida’s desire to determine its 
electors by the safe harbor of December 12, 2000.5 But if the counting 
had been completed on December 10, this concern would have been 
nonexistent. In other words, it often has been overlooked that the 
Court’s central reason for stopping the recount, the need to be done by 
December 12, was entirely of its own making when it granted the stay 
of the counting on December 9.6 
The Court had complete discretion whether to stay the counting. 
Under traditional principles of equity, a stay requires a finding of 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 
947–48 (2009); Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (“Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the 
Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, Justice Breyer’s 
proposed remedy—remanding to the Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally 
proper contest until December 18-contemplates action in violation of the Florida Election Code, 
and hence could not be part of an ‘appropriate’ order authorized by [Florida Statute § 
102.168(8)].”). 
 6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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irreparable injury and a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the 
merits.7 What was the irreparable injury to allowing the counting to 
continue? The U.S. Supreme Court issued no opinion justifying the stay. 
But Justice Antonin Scalia, writing only for himself, issued an opinion 
on December 9 explaining the stay.8 He said that Bush met the 
requirements for a stay: showing a substantial likelihood of prevailing 
on the merits and irreparable injury.9 Justice Scalia identified two 
injuries.10 First, Justice Scalia said that counting the uncounted votes 
risked placing a cloud over the legitimacy of a Bush presidency.11 In 
other words, if the counting put Gore ahead, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court disallowed it, there would be doubts about the legitimacy of 
Bush’s presidency. However, such speculation as to political fallout 
hardly seems to meet the legal requirement for “irreparable injury.” 
Maybe the counting would have put a cloud over the Bush presidency, 
or maybe people would have just accepted Bush as President anyway. 
The reality is by halting the counting, the U.S. Supreme Court still put a 
cloud over the Bush presidency. For those who voted for Gore on 
November 7, there always will be a cloud over the Bush presidency; for 
those who voted for Bush, they always will be thrilled that their 
candidate won. It is hard to turn this into irreparable injury. 
Second, Justice Scalia said that counting the ballots would cause 
them to degrade, and thus prevent a more accurate count at a later 
date.12 The problem with this argument is that there was nothing in the 
record to support Justice Scalia’s assertion about degradation of ballots. 
He just made it up. Moreover, it was a disingenuous concern—the Court 
stayed the counting so as to protect a more accurate later counting that it 
prevented from occurring.  
My point is simply that the Court had complete discretion whether to 
grant the stay. Even after it took the case and even after it granted the 
stay, the Court had discretion as to whether to decide the merits or 
dismiss the case as non-justiciable. As I have argued elsewhere, I 
believe also that the Court erred by not dismissing on ripeness and 
perhaps on political question doctrine grounds.13  
At the very least, the Court had discretion as to whether the issues 
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore were ripe for review. 
The central issue was whether the counting of votes would deny equal 
                                                                                                                     
 7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 8. Id. at at 1046–47. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1047. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1093, 1102–09 (2001). 
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protection.14 There would be a constitutional violation only if similar 
ballots were treated differently in the counting process. But it could not 
be known if this would occur until the counting occurred and the trial 
judge in Florida, Judge Terry Lewis, ruled on all of the challenges. Until 
then, it was purely speculative as to whether there would be a problem 
with similar ballots being treated differently. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in its per curiam opinion, focused on 
inequalities that already had occurred. The per curiam opinion points to 
differences in the Miami-Dade County and the Palm Beach County 
counting.15 But the counting that already had been done was not the 
issue before the U.S. Supreme Court. The only issue was whether the 
counting should continue. Prior experience was not predictive of what 
was to occur because of a key change: a single judge was overseeing the 
counting under the Florida Supreme Court’s decision. This judge was to 
hear all of the disputes and potentially could eliminate any inequalities 
by applying a uniform standard.  
Justice Stevens emphasized exactly this point in his dissent.16 He 
wrote: “Admittedly, the use of differing substandards for determining 
voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may 
raise serious concerns. Those concerns are alleviated—if not 
eliminated—by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately 
adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process.”17 Justice 
Stevens, however, did not draw a key conclusion from his 
observation—the challenge to the counting was not ripe for review. 
Only after the counting was completed could the parties claim that there 
was inequality and thus a constitutional violation. 
Phrased another way, the U.S. Supreme Court improperly treated an 
“as applied” equal protection challenge as if it were a facial challenge.18 
Bush was not arguing that the Florida election law was unconstitutional 
on its face. Neither in the briefs nor in the oral argument did Bush’s 
lawyers suggest such a facial attack. Rather, Bush argued that counting 
without uniform standards denied equal protection. This would be an 
equal protection violation only if, after the counting and the resolution 
of disputes by the judge, similar ballots were treated differently. But 
that could not possibly be known until all the ballots were counted. 
Until then, it would be purely speculative as to whether there would be 
a denial of equal protection. 
Bush v. Gore was not ripe for an even more basic reason: George W. 
Bush might well have ended up ahead after the counting. In that event, 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000).  
 15. Id. at 106–07; Amar, supra note 5, at 961–62. 
 16. 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 1103. 
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there obviously would have been no need for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
decide this appeal. The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a case is 
not ripe when it is unknown whether the injury will be suffered. 
Bush v. Gore was not ripe for review on December 9, when the stay 
was issued,19 or December 11, when the case was heard,20 or December 
12, when the case was decided.21 The case would have been ripe only 
after all the counting was done if: a) Gore came out ahead in Florida, 
and b) Bush could present evidence of inequalities in how the ballots 
were actually counted. Unless and until these eventualities occurred, the 
case was not ripe and should have been dismissed. 
Again, my point here is just that the Court had discretion as to 
whether to dismiss the case on ripeness grounds. It also might have 
found the matter to be a political question—it after all was 
quintessentially and profoundly political—and dismissed the case on 
that basis. 
Even after taking the case, halting the counting, and finding the case 
justiciable, the Court still had great discretion. Does the risk of counting 
similar ballots with different standards violate equal protection? 
Professor Amar describes this as “exuberant and unprecedented equal 
protection analysis.”22 Professor Amar forcefully explains the problems 
in the majority’s equal protection approach.23 At the very least, 
Professor Amar clearly demonstrates that reasonable Justices could 
have gone either way on the issue of whether there was an equal 
protection violation. 
Even after the Court took the case, halted the recount, found the 
matter justiciable, and determined that equal protection was violated, it 
still had discretion as to the remedy. The case could have been 
remanded to the Florida courts to decide whether, under Florida law, to 
halt the recount to meet the safe harbor of December 12 or whether to 
continue the recount with uniform standards for counting the uncounted 
ballots. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the choice to end the 
recount was entirely based on its interpretation of Florida law and its 
desire to have the electors decided by December 12. But it is well 
established that state courts are to get the last word as to the meaning of 
state law. This obviously was a situation that had never arisen in Florida 
and so the Florida courts had never ruled as to how this tension—
meeting the safe harbor as opposed to making sure that all of the votes 
were counted—was to be resolved. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 98. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Amar, supra note 5, at 965.  
 23. See Amar, supra note 5, at 960–64. 
2009] DUNWODY COMMENTARY 975 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion made two arguments. 
First, counting the uncounted votes without standards violates equal 
protection. Second, Florida law prevented the counting from continuing 
past December 12. This second point is indispensable to the Court’s 
decision to end the counting. Assuming that there were inequalities in 
the counting that violated the Constitution, there were two ways to 
remedy this situation: count none of the uncounted ballots or count all 
of the ballots with uniform standards. The latter would involve 
remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court for development of 
standards and for such relief as that court deemed appropriate. 
It must be emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that 
federal law prevented the counting from continuing. The only reason for 
not remanding the case was the Court’s judgment that Florida law 
prevented this.24 In two paragraphs near the end of the per curiam 
opinion, the Court explained why it was stopping the counting: 
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the 
legislature intended the State’s electors to “participat[e] 
fully in the federal electoral process,” as provided in 3 
U.S.C. § 5. . . . That statute, in turn, requires that any 
controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a 
conclusive selection of electors be completed by December 
12. That date is upon us, and there is no recount procedure 
in place under the State Supreme Court’s order that 
comports with minimal constitutional standards. Because it 
is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December 
12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have 
discussed, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Florida ordering a recount to proceed. 
Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are 
constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the 
Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy. . . . The only 
disagreement is as to the remedy. Because the Florida 
Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature 
intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, 
Justice Breyer’s proposed remedy—remanding to the 
Florida Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally 
proper contest until December 18—contemplates action in 
violation of the Florida Election Code, and hence could not 
be part of an “appropriate” order authorized by Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001).25 
This reasoning is recited at length to show that the sole reason the 
Court gave for ending the counting was based on its interpretation of 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98 (2000). 
 25. Id. at 110–11. 
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Florida law. However, no Florida statute stated or implied that the 
counting had to be done by December 12. The sole authority for the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion was one statement by the Florida Supreme 
Court. 
However, that statement was made in a very different context and at 
a time when the Florida Supreme Court was not faced with the issue 
posed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling. After the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided on December 12 that the counting without standards 
violated equal protection, the issue was what remedy was appropriate 
under Florida law: continue the counting past December 12 or end the 
counting to meet the December 12 deadline. The Supreme Court could 
not possibly know how the Florida Supreme Court would resolve this 
issue because it had never occurred before. However, prior Florida 
decisions emphasized the importance of making sure that every vote is 
accurately counted.26 The Florida Supreme Court might have relied on 
this precedent to continue the counting past December 12. Alternatively, 
the Florida Supreme Court might have ended the counting, treating 
December 12 as a firm deadline in Florida. 
Indeed, after Bush v. Gore was decided, the Florida Supreme Court 
issued a decision dismissing the case.27 Justice Shaw, in a concurring 
opinion, declared: 
[I]n my opinion, December 12 was not a “drop-dead” date 
under Florida law. In fact, I question whether any date prior 
to January 6 is a drop-dead date under the Florida election 
scheme. December 12 was simply a permissive “safe-
harbor” date to which the states could aspire. It certainly 
was not a mandatory contest deadline under the plain 
language of the Florida Election Code . . . .28 
Perhaps a majority of the Florida Supreme Court would have 
followed this view, perhaps not. The point is that this was a question of 
Florida law to be decided by the Florida Supreme Court. Of course, it is 
clearly established that state supreme courts get the final word as to the 
interpretation of state law. From a federalism perspective, it is 
inexplicable why the five Justices in the majority—usually the 
advocates of states’ rights on the Court—did not remand the case to the 
Florida Supreme Court to decide under Florida law whether the 
counting should continue.  
                                                                                                                     
 26. See, e.g., State ex rel. Millinor v. Smith, 144 So. 333, 335 (Fla. 1932) (“The right to a 
correct count of the ballots in an election is a substantial right which it is the privilege of every 
candidate for office to insist on, in every case where there has been a failure to make a proper 
count. . . .”). 
 27. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam), rev’d per curiam sub nom. 
Bush II, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 28. Id. at 128–29 (Shaw, J., concurring). 
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Again, at the very least, Bush v. Gore demonstrates that the Court 
had discretion, choices that could have gone either way, on whether to 
take the case, whether to halt the recount, whether to find the matter 
justiciable, whether to conclude that equal protection was violated, and  
whether to end the counting or send the matter back to the Florida 
courts. Although I believe that the Court was wrong at each step, here I 
only seek to show that there was discretion; mechanical judging was 
impossible. 
THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION REFLECTS THE JUSTICES’ VALUES 
AND IDEOLOGY 
I am continually stunned to hear conservatives defend a view of 
judging that purports to exclude any importance of a Justice’s 
background, values, and ideology. How can any person decide what is 
“reasonable” in the context of the Fourth Amendment or what is 
“compelling” in applying strict scrutiny except by making a value 
choice? This does not mean that the choices are based on whim or 
caprice. They are influenced by what has been deemed reasonable or 
compelling in other cases and by the arguments presented by counsel. 
But ultimately, it is still inescapably a value choice to be made. 
Bush v. Gore is irrefutable evidence of this point. Republicans, 
including the five in the majority on the U.S. Supreme Court, took 
Bush’s side in the litigation; Democrats, including the two on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, took Gore’s. Professor Amar briefly reviews the 
partisan breakdown among the scholarly literature, mentioning critics of 
the decision as including liberal law professors like Margaret Jane 
Radin, Mark Kelman, Robert Gordon, Derrick Bell, Jeb Rubenfeld, and 
Jack Balkin.29 Professor Amar also quotes defenders of the decision as 
including Richard Epstein, Michael McConnell, and Charles Fried.30 
Surely, this political division is not coincidence. I have often speculated 
that if the results had come out differently in Florida (if it was Gore who 
was ahead by a slim margin and it was Bush who wanted a recount), the 
sides would have simply flipped. 
Some have suggested that Bush v. Gore was a baldly partisan choice 
by Republican Justices to make the Republican candidate the next 
President. Vincent Bugliosi advanced this view and even argued for 
impeachment of the Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority.31 
I believe, however, that the role of politics was more subtle and more 
profound. On Friday, December 8, after the Florida Supreme Court 
ordered the counting of uncounted votes, everyone I knew who voted 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Amar, supra note 5, at 947–49. 
 30. Amar, supra note 5, at 949–51. 
 31. VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT 1 (2001). 
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for Gore praised the decision, and everyone I knew who voted for Bush 
decried the ruling. I immediately said that there was no reason to think 
that the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court would be any different. 
In fact, it would have been much easier for the dissenting Justices on 
the Court and the liberal law professors to embrace the equal protection 
argument. Part of the irony of Bush v. Gore is that it was virtually the 
only case in which Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas found an equal 
protection violation, except in striking down affirmative action 
programs. 
In other words, it was not that the five Justices in the majority set out 
to make sure that Bush became President, and the four dissenters acted 
to make sure that Gore was President. I truly believe that each of the 
nine Justices deeply believed that he or she was making a ruling on the 
law, not on partisan grounds. But how each saw the case was entirely a 
product of the Justices’ biases and views. 
This decision has profound implications for how we think about the 
law. We are all result-oriented, consciously or unconsciously, much of 
the time. We come to conclusions and then look for arguments to 
support them. We constantly hear criticisms of judges or academics for 
being result-oriented. Yet there is no way to avoid this. The premises 
we begin with influence, if not determine, the conclusions we come to. 
Bush v. Gore unquestionably seemed a result-oriented decision in the 
sense that the nine Justices each came to a result that was consistent 
with their political views, so far as we know them. That does not mean 
that it was corrupt or even unique among judicial decisions. In the vast 
majority of important cases, the Justices’ conclusions are a reflection of 
the views with which they started. 
CONCLUSION 
Bush v. Gore was a unique moment in American history: the only 
time in which the U.S. Supreme Court has played a direct role in 
deciding a presidential election. It is therefore a decision and a series of 
events that warrant reexamination, especially with the benefit of time 
and hindsight. Professor Amar’s excellent analysis of what happened 
does exactly this. 
My point, however, has been that the case also stands for something 
more basic in the never ending debate over judicial review: Justices 
have great discretion and how they exercise that discretion is a product 
of their life experiences, values, and ideology. It is long past time to get 
past disingenuous slogans like “judges are umpires” and “judges should 
apply not make the law.” Keeping Bush v. Gore in mind is a large step 
in this direction. 
